Innovation, Innovation and Modern War– Class 6– Will Roper

We just held our 6th session of our new nationwide security class Technology, Innovation and Modern War Joe Felter, Raj Shah and I developed a class to examine the new military systems, functional concepts and teachings that will emerge from 21st century technologies– Space, Cyber, AI & & Maker Learning and Autonomy.

Today’s subject was Developments in Getting Technologies for Modern War.

Catch up with the class by reading our summaries of the previous five classes here.

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Our visitor speaker was Hon. Will Roper, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force.

A few of the readings for this class session consisted of: Defense Innovation is Falling Short, Dr. Will Roper’s current AMA about AFWERX and AFVentures and The Future of Defense task-force-report

Acquisition, innovation, and logistics
In some of our class sessions you have actually heard about how acquisition in the Department of Defense hasn’t kept up with brand-new threats, adversaries, and new technologies. However Will Roper who runs Flying force acquisition, technology and logistics, gives lie to that assertion. He gets it. And he’s running as fast as he can to move the Air Force into the 21st century. It was an eye-opening discussion.

Will Roper is responsible for spending $60 billion obtaining 550 programs in addition to technology and logistics. His resume reads like he trained for the job: bachelor’s and master’s in physics and Ph.D from Oxford in Mathematics. He began his profession at MIT Lincoln Labs, then was Chief Designer at the Missile Defense Company, the founding Director of the Pentagon’s Strategic Capabilities Workplace. (The SCO imagines new, often unanticipated and game-changing uses of existing government and business systems.)

This whole class session was a talk by Will and Q&A with the trainees. It would be simple to just put up the video and the transcription in this blog site and be finished with it. That would do a real injustice to the insights Will offered. It’s fascinating to note the number of his observations echo the ones Chris Brose made in the previous session. I’ve drawn out and paraphrased a few listed below, but I prompt you to read the transcript and enjoy the video.

Here’s what Will had to state:

Competition with China
I view the competition with China as one of the seminal difficulties that we’re going to face in this century. It’s not a fait accompli how it’s going to end. It’s a very various challenge, due to the fact that it’s not a Cold War part 2. We’re very financially linked with this competitor. We do have to treat it just as if it was an existential race. Due to the fact that we have a really different world view than that rival does.

Industrial technology has altered the DOD design
Business technologies are being driven faster than any federal government can stay up to date with, though numerous federal governments are trying to steer it to their own advantage. And much of the technological advancements that could be crucial to the military are going to be available to everyone. So, the design that worked so well in the Cold War, where you made a technology development, you did it solely inside your own country. And due to the fact that you were annexed from your rival, you might establish that innovation, instantiate it in your military and field it for advantage, truly does not make a lot of sense in this years and in this century. Innovation is what it is. Federal governments play a strong function in it, we can incubate it, we can accelerate it, we can develop it, however we’re progressively a smaller portion of what takes place commercially.

I see the Pentagon being in a time of crisis, where it’s really attempting to figure out its role. Where it’s not the major funder of innovation any longer. It has a substantial budget. It’s a large market. It’s not the major driver of development. And I discover the majority of the individuals operating in it have a difficult time with that. They have been in the building given that prior to the Cold War and have actually not been outdoors to see that the times have actually altered. I love the times that we’re in. Technology is inexpensive, it’s ubiquitous, it’s fast, it’s moving.

The Pentagon’s difficulty is to reboot itself, to get rid of those Cold War processes that we’re great at inventing innovation that would change the world.

Now we have to be great at bringing innovation in from the outside
Now, we have to be great at adjusting innovation, bringing it in from the outdoors and instantiating it. We need to be much better at developing partnerships. It’s not really the method we arrange the service. And there are so lots of excellent locations for collaboration between the military and business innovators, that we’re missing out on out on chances. And AFWERX and other companies that I have actually tried to stand up in the Air Force to create partnerships are a main paradigm for how we move development forward.

The military is going to have to deal with technology wherever it is as a battlefield in and of itself. And that is not how the Pentagon is established to run.

If we do not engage proactively, I believe what we have seen occur with enthusiast drones a few years back is a harbinger of what might end up being the status quo in future years. Where innovations may emerge in one ingenious sector, but if we’re not proactive and engaging with them, then the supply chain and market will move overseas to another nation’s benefit. And this is not the Pentagon’s playbook.

The presupposition that the future can be forecasted is no longer real
We are excellent at having an adversary that we can anticipate well. Having great intelligence on them, formulating our view of their future, developing a model of what we believe they will bring to bear on the battleground both technologically as well as operationally. We develop our own counter option to what we predict.

We develop it, hopefully get to it first. And as soon as we field it, we hope that countering what we have actually done results in a strategy that leads to us success.

That worked well in the Cold War. There’s no sign that will work well in the scenario we find ourselves in today. As I have actually as I’ve engaged in Air Force and Area Force acquisition it starts with the presupposition that the future can be anticipated. You will not find that documented in any acquisition file. However it’s really fundamental to how the Pentagon works. The future is predictable. And it’s not.

No informing which technology is going to lead
I have no concept what the future is going to be. I have no concept what 2030 is going to be. Who understands what technology is going to be the next big thing. You’ll discover individuals in significantly various camps. You’ll discover one group centering around AI. However you’ll discover various people who will state no, quantum systems are going to enable significantly various phenomenology to be brought to bear. Not just calculating and encryption but noticing. And they’ll be next to a group that will state “Nope, biological systems are going to enable fundamentally different approaches to building sensors and computing and sensing.” And you’re not going to need to wait on those elegant quantum systems since you can hack biology and do it sooner. And the camps go on.

So that simply informs me this is a terrific time for technology. It’s everywhere, it’s not pricey to engage in. And there’s no informing which innovation is going to lead to that next Industrial Transformation. I believe that really is the competitors amongst nations, that a lot of these technologies might birth a new industrial transformation. And whichever nation does it, it’s going to be to such a chosen advantage, that the military part of the equation is most likely moot.

The Pentagon requires to be fast and nimble
The military, since it is a very stabilizing and distinct part of any nation’s market system, has to play a catalyzing function in setting that nation up to find that Industrial Revolution much faster. The Pentagon is not suited for this. The $60 billion per year procurement system that I run for the Air Force and Space force, the strategy is quite easy. You require to be remarkably quick and nimble. The Cold War system wasn’t. And the system in this century need to be. Since we don’t know what the next big thing is going to be. So let’s be all set to adjust to it. Speeding the system up is not as hard as you think. It’s simply not what was valued in the past. So you just merely need to alter the value system, change the culture, and the system will accelerate.

The harder part is teaching the Flying force and Area Force to work in the wider community. It’s very simple to fall back into the historical procedure that anticipates the future, derives a service for that future, and then kicks it out to a handful of companies, defense companies, that we have traditionally gone to in recent times to help us develop that future. And with many fields of innovation now available, we just can’t deal with a handful of business and expect to win.

Acquisition and procurement need new guidelines
Defense Research and Advancement is just one fifth of the overall R&D that our country does. In the height of the Cold War we were 4 fifths. That doesn’t indicate that we have actually gotten any even worse at research and advancement at the Pentagon, it just indicates that the landscape has actually altered. And we haven’t. Teaching our acquisition system, our procurement system, that it requires a different set of rules to work in the 4 fifths of our country’s R&D that’s business has been exceptionally challenging. Since everything about the way we work is hard for industrial innovators. Standing up organizations like AFWERX that have a totally different model and culture and ethos, their task is to treat emerging business markets as a battleground. And to attempt to bring the military’s mission as a way to speed up commercial companies, not simply to assist military missions, however to accelerate them as an end state in and of itself. Since that remains in our nationwide interest.

Accelerating Innovation
I found that within the Flying force, we can rally around this as a core objective. That accelerating technology is something that can be understood by anyone that we have actually trained in the military since it’s simple to comprehend it. If that company, if that technology, if that market, does not happen in the US first, it’s likely to happen somewhere else. And if it happens elsewhere, there’s no warranty we’ll have access to it. That’s a 2nd imperative that we have to be able to work in our whole tech community.

The DOD– Great in hardware, lagging in software application
The summary of what I’ve seen is the Pentagon is very excellent at keeping technological disciplines that were born in the Cold War. We’re still great at things based upon Maxwell’s formula. That radars and stealth and antennas and radios and products. We have not found out to work in the commercial environment.

And we have not discovered to operate in digital and software-driven technology. If we find out those just really small handful of lessons, we’ll be closer to being the nimble, disruptive system we need to be. Now we’re competing versus an enemy in China that will likely have double our GDP and quadruple our population, and maybe have 15 times the STEM graduates that we’ll have by the year 2030. We’re not going to beat them at scale. Speed and agility are the only manner in which we can make sure that we have an upper hand.

I’m extremely happy with the development the Flying force has made. This is simply lap one of what is going to be an extremely long race. And this race does not end. There’s no other way to forecast what completion state relationship will be between the United States and China.

So we require to expect the very best but get ready for the worst. For the time being that means dealing with every brand-new innovation or possible brand-new technology as an opportunity to wish for however also a hinderance to fear. And I hope that if we inculcate that seriousness within our company, that we will become the type of Air Force that is ready for whatever we call this competitors with China.

Some individuals call it a hot peace. I do not really care about slang and slogans. I feel in one’s bones it’s genuine. We have to treat it seriously and stay immediate. Far, I have actually been extremely pleased with how all set for the obstacle that we’ve been. And I hope that we won’t be the only service to leave as aggressively as we have actually done. It’s going to take a whole team to keep this up gradually.

Check out the entire transcript of Will Roper’s talk here and enjoy the video listed below.

If you can’t see the video of Will Roper’s talk click here

It was interesting to note what Will didn’t state in a public forum as what he did say. My guess is that in this transition from tradition systems to new platforms, each of the service acquisition executives needs to deal with the parochial issues of existing professionals and congress, all scrambling to keep their part of a limited defense budget plan. Acquisition execs like Will likely invest more time trying to get rid of existing “legacy” programs as they do getting brand-new ones funded. For the Air Force it’s manned versus unmanned airplane. For the Navy it’s more carriers versus other platforms. For all services it’s beautiful systems versus mass expendable ones, etc.

And as an extra bonus offer read Will Roper’s talk “There is No Spoon” here.

Lessons Learned

• Competition with China is one of the influential challenges we’re going to face in this century
• The Pentagon is excellent at preserving technological disciplines that were born in the Cold War.
  • The Cold War design of solely inventing it and then utilizing it only for your armed force is no longer real
  • Today’s technological advancements are going to be offered to everybody.
  • We have actually not discovered to operate in digital and software-driven technology
  • The Pentagon’s obstacle is to reboot itself, to eliminate those Cold War processes
• Now we need to be proficient at bringing innovation in from the outside
• The presupposition that the future can be predicted is no longer real
  • No informing which technology (AI, autonomy, biotech, space, and so on) is going to lead
• You need to be incredibly fast and nimble. The Cold War system wasn’t.
  • Speeding the system up is not what was valued in the past
  • So you have to change the value system, the culture, and the system will speed up
• We need to work in the broader environment. We just can’t deal with a handful of business and expect to win